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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS AS A LIMITATION
ON THE CONTEMPT POWER
In the last fifteen years a problem has presented itself to the courts
in the form of a limitation on a power which, prior to this time, most
courts had come to consider as axiomatic. This was the power to
punish for contempt. In its broadest sense, this power had existed
in the courts from the time of their inception, founded in a public
policy which regarded it as an attribute both inherent and necessary
for the protection of the judicial function.' While never entirely
above regulation, 2 restriction upon any aspect of its exercise was re-
garded as a matter of immediate concern to the courts in which it
vested. Thus, when Bridges v. California3 decided in 1941 that the
power of state courts to impose criminal punishment for contempt on
individuals who, by public comment, attempt to exert influence over
judicial proceedings was subject to the freedoms of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment, the decision was looked upon by
many writers with varying degrees of alarm.4 Nor was it unnatural
that the flood of commentaries which the case evoked should deal
primarily with the long range effects of the decision, rather than to
attempt more than a surface analysis of the holding itself. Viewing
the law as it developed out of the Bridges case and the ones which
followed, it is felt that there is a need for clarification of this nebulous
field, and to submit an interpretation which, it is hoped, represents the
law as it stands today.
Contempt may be defined generally as any act which is calculated
to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a legislative or judicial body in the
proper administration of its duties or which tends to lessen its author-
ity or dignity.5 Contempt of court usually takes the form of diso-
bedience to a mandate of the court, or of disorderly behavior which
tends to have this effect. As such, it may be either direct or con-
structive in nature. A direct contempt is one committed in the pres-
ence of the court in session or, in some cases, before the judge at
chambers;6 constructive contempt, on the other hand, arises from
117 C.J.S. 55.
2 Ibid.
3 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346 (Annotated) (1941).
4 Free Speech and Contempt of Court, 36 ILL. L. REV. 599 (1942) ; The Clear and
Present Danger Test, 27 IowA L. REv. 467 (1942) ; Contempt by Publication,
23 IND. L. J. 192 (1948); Con)rolling Press and Radio Influence on Trials. 63
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1950) ; Due Process For Whom? 4 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1951) ;
Freedom of The Press-A Menace to Justice? 37 IowA L. REv. 249 (1951).
5 17 C.J.S. 1; Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 11 S.E. 621, 622, 23 A.L.R. 183(1922).
6 17 C.J.S. 6; State v. McClaugherty, 33 W.Va. 250, 10 S.E. 407 (1889) ; Pelletier
v. Glacier County, 107 Mont. 221, 82 P.2d 595, 597 (1938).
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matters not occurring in the immediate presence of the court, but near
enough thereto so as to affect the due and orderly course of the pro-
ceedings.7 Either form may give rise to civil or criminal liability. The
distinction between civil and criminal contempt lies in a distinction as
to whom the duty violated is primarily owed. While the latter partakes
of the nature of an offense against the court, and is punishable sum-
marily, the former is a failure to do something which the party is re-
quired to do for the benefit of another party to the proceeding. It is
therefore not primarily an offense against the court itself -though
it is this as well-but against the party in whose behalf the mandate
was issued, and the resultant fine is an indemnity rather than a penalty.8
The question presented in the Bridges decision, considered in the
light of the above definitions, was limited to a determination of whether,
under the First Amendment, the publication in newspapers, magazines
and other channels of communication of matter tending to affect the
impartiality of judges or juries amounts to such disorderly conduct out
of the presence of the court as to permit the punishment of such activi-
ties as constructive criminal contempt. As in other areas of constitu-
tional law, this involved the ticklish problem of balancing private
rights against public needs; weighing the freedoms of speech and
press against the necessity of judicial independence from external
pressures. While decided on constitutional grounds for the first
time in the Bridges case, the problem was basically not a new one, but
one which had been plagueing courts for well over two centuries.
THE IMPACT OF FREE PRESS ON TEE CONTEMPT POWER
The English courts, which were unhampered in their approach to
the question by the above mentioned constitutional guarantees, adopted
at an early stage an extremely narrow view regarding any limitation
which might be imposed on the contempt power. Their attitude is,
perhaps, best expressed by the language of Humphreys, J. in Rex v.
Davies:
"I venture to think that no judge with long criminal experi-
ence will fail to be able to recall instances in which the publica-
tion of matters . . .has had the effect of making the task of a
judge extremely difficult, and no one has the right to publish
matter which will have that effect." 9
Simply stated, this means that English courts have the power to
punish, as contempt, conduct having any tendency whatsoever to affect
or prejudice judicial proceedings. In the .area of public comment,
this would include not only matters affecting issues then pending be-
717 C.J.S. 6; Maryott v. Maryott, 124 Neb. 224, 246 N.W. 343 (1933).
8 Staley v. So. Jersey Realty Co., 90 At. 1042, 1043, 83 N.J. Eq. 300, L.R.A. 1917B
113, Ann. Cas. 1916E 955 (1914) ; Fenton v. Walling, 139 F.2d 608, 609 (1943).




fore the court in question, but also matters concerning litigation
already terminated at the time of publication, on the theory that such
criticism, should it be such as to warrant the inference, would tend
to degrade the court and might have a detrimental effect on the court's
ability to decide other cases, both future and pending, of a similar
nature.10 As a practical matter, however, in such cases few of the
English judges were willing to go this far. While recognizing that
they had the power, they limited its exercise to comments involving
pending cases."
This view was carried over into the American federal courts by
the Act of 1789,12 which provided that "Courts of the United States
shall have power ... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the dis-
cretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hear-
ing before the same."' 3 Like the English courts most American
tribunals recognised that the power was an extraordinary and arbi-
trary one, and should be exercised only as a last resort, and then' only
with great caution.1 4 Nevertheless, abuses arose,15 culminating in the
celebrated trial to impeach District Judge Peck for having imprisoned
and disbarred one Lawless, an attorney who had published an adverse
comment on a decision which the judge had made against him, which
decision was on appeal at the time of publication.' 6 Peck was acquitted,
but as a result of the trial the Act of March 2, 183127 was passed,
which limited the power of federal courts to inflict summary punish-
ment tor contempt to cases involving misconduct "in the presence of
the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice." The language of this statute, which has survived in sub-
stantially unaltered form to the present day,' was interpreted only
four years later in Ex Parte Poulson."9 That case expressly denied
the power of federal courts under the statute to punish as contempt
the publication of an allegedly "offensive" article relative even to a
pending case. It was there held that the statute embraced only such
misbehavior as occurred in or near the immediate vicinity of the
l 13 C.J. 37; Rex v. Parke, 2 K.B. 442 (1903),; See also annotation to Burdette
v. Commonwealth, 68 L.R.A. 251.
"Ibid., n. 10; Hunt v. Clark, 58 L.J.Q.B. 490-495, 19 English Rul. Cas. 238 (1889);
Reg. v. Payne and Cooper, 1 Q.B 577-582, 19 English Rul. Cas. 246 (1896).
12 1 STAT. 73, 83.
s The language of this statute did not expressly prohibit exercise of the contempt
power in cases where the matter published concerned cases already terminated.
See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the U.S., 28 COL. L. REV. 401,
409, et seq.
14 Hollingsworth v. Duane, Fed. Cas. No. 6, 616 (1801).
15 See Nelles & King, supra, n. 13.
16 Stansbury, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833).
174 STAT. 487.
18 18 U.S.C.A. §401.
19 Fed. Cas. # 11, 350 (1835).
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court.2 0 This marked a complete reversal of the English, or common
law rule. Previous decisions had established that adverse comment
or criticism on a case already decided would suffice, in principle if not
in practice, to invoke the contempt power. The Poulson decision, with
a single sweep, wiped away the power as an effective control of such
activities. The press was literally given free rein, even to the point
of subjecting pending controversies to the unfettered power of the pen.
The cause of free press received a temporary setback in 1917
with the decision of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S.,"' which attempted
to replace the holding of the Poulson case with what has been termed
the "reasonable tendency" rule. This was nothing more than an inter-
pretation of the words of the federal statute "or so near thereto,"
as having a causal, rather than a geographical connotation. Under this
theory the court held that the publication of adverse comment on a
pending case by a newspaper was punishable as contempt if the article
had a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct the impartial discharge of the
judicial office. The holding was undoubtedly an attempt to return to
the previous rule of unrestricted exercise of the contempt power in
pending cases. The Toledo case was overruled in 1940 by Nye v.
U.S., - " which reiterated the doctrine of the Poulson case and held
that the language of the statute necessitated that the conduct punished
be "geographically proximate" to the court.23
It is important at this point to note that these decisions govern
only federal courts. They were not decided on constitutional grounds,
but involved questions of purely statutory construction. Whether the
statute embodies the full extent of the contempt power permissible
under the Constitution is a question which, to this writer's knowledge,
has never been expressly decided.2 4 Nevertheless, it may be taken
as settled that public comment on a pending case, unless circulated in
or near the court or in some other manner employed so as to focus
the attention of court or jury upon it and thus bring it within the
20 "Nor can any publication, which holds out no corrupt motive to influence a
juror, witness, or officer, or uses any threats to influence, intimidate, or impede
him in his duty, be the subject of an indictment (for contempt) consistently
with this law. The press is free, if not set to work in the presence of the court,
or so near as to interrupt its business. The law does not prohibit any endeavor
made to influence or intimidate a juror or witness, if corruption, force, or
threats are avoided." Ex Parte Poulson, ibid., n. 19.
212-47 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1917).
22313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1940).
23 In the Nye case, the misbehavior had occurred some 100 miles from the court.
24 See, however, Smotherman v. U.S., 186 F.2d 676 (1950). That case seemed to
indicate that statutory and constitutional tests would be substantially identical.
Actually, it is difficult to see how this could be so, since the constitutional test(the clear and present danger rule, treated later in this article) seems to be
causal, rather than spatial, in character.
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purview of the statute, will not justify a finding of contempt by a
federal court.
25
In view of the policy of federal law in this area, a constitutional
determination of the power as limited by the First Amendment could
come only from a consideration of the power of state courts. As
might be expected, few of the states copied the federal statute. The
majority, by statute or judicial decision, held fairly close to the
common law rule,26 making pendency the primary test.2 7 Until 1924,
when Gitlow zt. New York28 recognized that the guarantees of free
expression found in the First Amendment were also embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment, as a limitation on the states, there was noth-
ing to prevent them from doing so. Even after the Gitlow decision,
since the Toledo holding was in effect, the broad rule of the case im-
posed few restrictions on state power. After the Toledo case was
overruled, however, the problem became acute, and it was scarcely a
year later that the issue was squarely presented before the Supreme
Court in the Bridges case.
THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE
Two cases were involved in the Bridges decision. In the first, two
members of a labor union had been convicted of assaulting and beating
a non-union truck driver and had applied for probation. The Los
Angeles Times, while the applications were still pending, in an editorial
captioned Probation for Gorillas., vigorously denounced the two men
and admonished the judge before whom the matters were pending
that he "will make a serious mistake if he grants probation to Shannon
and Holmes. This community needs the example of their assignment
to the jute mill." 2 The editorial was cited for contempt and the cita-
tion affirmed by the California Supreme Court, under the authority
of the Toledo case, as having "an inherent and reasonable tendency
to interfere with the orderly administration of justice in an action
before a court for consideration." 30 The second case involved the
publication of a telegram sent by one Harry Bridges, a prominent
west coast labor leader, to the Secretary of Labor, characterizing an
order made by a Los Angeles judge in a labor dispute31 as "out-
25 Ibid., n. 24. See also Laughlin v. U.S., 151 F.2d 281, 285, certiorari denied 326
U.S. 777, 66 S.Ct. 265, 90 L.Ed. 470 (1945). While not strictly in point, the
case indicates that this would be the rule in a proper case.
26 See Annotation, 159 A.L.R. 1379; 12 AM. Ju. 412-418.
27 See, however, 17 C.J.S. 43 and cases there cited, to the contrary.
28 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1924).
29 Penitentiary.
30 Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940).
31 See Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal 2d. 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939). This dispute
involved a struggle between two rival unions, I.L.W.U. and I.L.A., for the
control of a particular local. When the local attempted to ally with I.L.W.U.,
I.L.A. sued to enjoin the officers of the local from working on behalf of the
1956-1957]
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rageous," and threatening that attempted enforcement of the order
would "tie up the whole Pacific coast" in a statewide strike. The
contempt citation in this case was also affirmed by the California
Supreme Court. On appeal, four justices dissenting, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the California court. Following the pattern
set down in the Nye case, the Court rejected the "reasonable tendency"
rule as a constitutional measure of the contempt power. As stated
by the Court, the defect of this rule lay in its uncertainty, in its
tendency to subject the freedoms of speech and press to the "timeli-
ness and importance of the ideas seeking expression." 32 Instead, the
Court proposed as a proper test the "clear and present danger"
doctrine, a principle well known in other fields of constitutional law
and, perhaps, best expressed as "whether or not the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils sought to be prevented."3 3 In enunciating this doctrine and ex-
tending it to the instant case, the intention of the Court was to intro-
duce a formula which it felt was "more capable of definition" and
which, by requiring an extremely high degree of imminence of the
substantive evil-far more than would suffice to meet the require-
ments of the "reasonable tendency" rule-would thereby afford
more protection to the freedoms of the First Amendment, which
should be interpreted in the broadest sense compatible with good
government.
Actually, it is doubtful whether the doctrine of itself accomplishes
this purpose. The sole distinction between the two is one of degree.
Moreover, the Court itself recognized that the problem of balancing
free speech against the necessity of independent judicial action was
one which was incapable of being captured completely in a single
formula. Once it is established that the matter commented on is
pending in a court and is thereby capable of being affected, attempting
to differentiate a "reasonable tendency" from a "clear and present
danger" and from this determination to emerge with a workable rule
of conduct is a task for one skilled in dealing in the subtle realm
of rhetorical ether. Nevertheless, applying the rule to the facts of
the case, the Court arrived at the following results: First, under no
circumstances could mere criticism, justified or unjustified, tending
to detract from the dignity of a court constitute a clear and present
danger to justice; courts cannot, either as a constitutional or as a
former. The injunction order issued, but enforcement of the order was
promptly stated by the court, pending defendant's motion for new trial. It was
at this point that the Bridges telegram was published.
=
2 Supra, n.3. 314 U.S., at p. 269.
-3 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1918).
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practical matter, preserve the dignity of the bench by forbidding
adverse comment on judicial action. Secondly, neither the Times
editorial nor the Bridges telegram tended, to the degree required,
to affect the ability of the court to decide the issues then pending be-
fore it. The former merely threatened future criticism, the latter
a statewide strike, and both were to be expected anyway should a
decision unfavorable to the parties concerned be handed down.34
It was argued, with some force, that the Bridges decision accomp-
lished on constitutional grounds what the Nye and Poulson cases had
held as a matter of statutory construction. It was contended that,
although refusing to deny the power of courts in a proper case to
punish publications which tend to prejudice pending judicial proceed-
ings, in effect the court placed an implicit stamp of approval on any-
thing that might be said outside the courtroom. 35 While it is apparent
from the above discussion that the majority was manifestly reluctant
to find a clear and present danger to justice, it is difficult to see how
the decision can be said to have had such far-reaching consequences.
Standing alone, and purged of the broad, rhetorical considerations
used by the Court in reaching its ultimate conclusions, the actual hold-
ing amounts to little more than the limited, and rather obvious proposi-
tion that the mind of an individual will not generally be influenced
by telling him something he already knows. The real importance of
the Bridges decision lay, not in what was held on the facts at bar, but
in the adoption of an attitude with which future cases would be viewed,
and to this extent the criticism of the Bridges case was to receive some
justification.
The problem received additional attention, and the position of the
Court was more closely defined when the issue was again presented
in Pennekanip v. Florida.36 That case involved two editorials which
appeared in the Miami Herald, and which attacked in no uncertain
terms the alleged "partiality" of a circuit judge in handling a series
of indictments for rape issued by a Miami grand jury. The indict-
ments had been found to be defective and had been returned for rein-
34 "From the indications in the record of the position taken by the Los Angeles
Times on labor controversies in the past, there could have been little doubt of
its attitude toward the probation of Shannon and Holmes. In view of the
paper's long-continued militancy in this field, it is inconceivable that any judge
in Los Angeles would expect anything but adverse criticism from it in the
event probation were granted.. .. "
As respects the strike telegram the court commented: "Let us assume that
the (Bridges) telegram could be construed as an announcement of Bridges' in-
tention to call a strike .... With an eye on the realities of the situation, we
cannot assume that Judge Schmidt was unaware of the possibility of a strike
as a consequence of his decision." Bridges v. California, supra, n.3. 314 U.S.
at pp. 273, 279.
35 Supra, n.3. Frankfurter, J. dissenting. Frankfurter, in effect, urges the adop-
tion of the reasonable tendency rule, with pendency the primary test.36 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 190 L.Ed. 1295 (1946).
1956-1957]
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dictment, which was accomplished the following day and before the
first editorial reached print. The article all but accused the judge of
outright collusion with the accused rapists, charging him with an
". .apparent willingness to go out to find every possible techni-
cality of the law to protect the defendants, to block, thwart,
hinder, embarrass and nullify prosecution .. . (so as to) set
people to wonder whether their courts are being subverted into
refuges for lawbreakers." 37
The impressions thereby intended to be conveyed were entirely false,
and on a finding that the cases were pending at the time of publica-
tion the Florida Supreme Court approved the circuit court's issuance
of the contempt citation, deeming the Bridges case not controlling.38
Granting certiorari, the United States Court accepted the Florida
Court's finding that the cases were pending, but the Bridges decision
was held to be conclusive of the issue and the state court's ruling was
reversed. The theory of the reversal was that, while the cases as a
whole were pending at the time of publication, the particular issue
which had given rise to the publication-the finding that the indict-
ments were defective-had already been decided, 39 and hence the
editorials were in the nature of criticism of judicial action taken,
which under the Bridges case would not support a citation for con-
tempt. Only if the particular issue treated by the publication was
pending at the time the article reached print would the Court be at
liberty to determine whether there was a clear and present danger that
the decision of that issue only would be affected thereby.
The contention was strongly urged, in opposition to this holding,
that the articles in question were certainly broad enough to affect the
future disposition of other matters on which the cases were still pend-
ing. Answering the argument, the Court had this to say:
"The law deals in generalities and external standards and cannot
depend on the varying degrees of moral courage or stability in
37 Ibid., n. 35. 328 U.S. at p. 337.
38 "The Bridges case was disposed of on authority of the 'Clear and Present
Danger' cases, which are not analogous to most of the state cases because they
arise from a different state of the law. The ultimate test of the Bridges case
requires that the 'substantive evil must be extremely high before utterances
can be punished.' Even if this test is to (be) the rule in the state courts, they
are authorized to apply it by their own law and standards and unless the appli-
cation is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable, their judgment should not be
disturbed." Pennekamp v. State, 156 Fla. 227, 22 So.2d 875 (1945) noted at 159
A.L.R. 1391.
39 "What is meant by clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice?
No definition could give an answer. Certainly this criticism of the judge's in-
clinations or actions in these pending non-jury proceedings could not directly
affect such administration. This criticism of their actions could not affect their
ability to decide the issues. Here there is only criticism of judicial action al-
ready taken, although the cases were still pending on other points or might




the face of criticism which individual judges may possess....
In this case too many fine-drawn assumptions against the inde-
pendence of judicial action must be made to call such a possi-
bility a clear and present danger to justice. For this to follow,
there must be a judge of less than ordinary fortitude without
friends or support or a powerful and vindictive newspaper bent
on a rule or ruin policy, and a public unconcerned with or un-
interested in the truth or the protection of their judicial insti-
tutions."40
The Court was apparently unwilling to admit that these conditions
existed in Miami at the time.
The above language has been interpreted by many writers to con-
stitute the basis upon which the "clear and present danger" rule will be
applied in all cases.4' Whether this is true or not, it must be admitted
that the language is rather startling. In effect, it imposes an objective
standard upon the character of jurists and imputes to the "reasonable
judge" a stoicism in the face of public pressure which approaches the
angelic. It refuses to admit that a judge worthy of the name would
allow himself to be consciously influenced by extra-judicial considera-
tions - a conclusion which may or may not be justified, and one which,
certainly, this writer would not be so bold as to challenge. But perhaps
more unrealistically (if we concur in the opinion of Justice Frank-
furter) it overlooks the fact that even the finest judicial logic is essen-
tially subjective in operation, and that the best judges are still human
beings, social in nature, and subject to being unconsciously swayed
by the psychological pull of public comment. 42 Of course, it must be
noted that the language was directed toward the determination of a
precise and limited issue, and was employed more as a crutch upon
which to justify a somewhat artificial and over-technical limitation on
the term "pending" than as a test of clear and present danger.43
Whether the Court would use the same approach in a case where the
40 Supra, n.35. 328 U.S. at pp. 348, 349.
41 Supra, n.4.
42 Supra, n.35. Frankfurter, J., concurring. It is to be noted, however, that in
making this argument, Frankfurter is in substantial agreement with the ma-
jority in its definition of "pending" and holds that under the instant facts thejudge could not have been affected, consciously or subconsciously. This seems
to be a rather unrealistic restriction on what would otherwise be a powerful
argument.
43 Supra, n.38. Unfortunately, the majority does not pursue the question of what
constitutes "pending" within the meaning of the "clear and present danger" rule
beyond this brief commentary. This may be one reason for the emphasis given
by most writers to its "objective standard of judges" analysis. The best treat-
ment of the question is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter.
"'Pending' is not used with the technical inclusiveness that it has in the phrase
lis pendens .... Where the power to punish for contempt is asserted, it is not
important that the case is technically in court or that further proceedings ...
are available .... The decisive consideration is whether the judge or the jury
is, or presently will be, pondering a decision that comment seeks to affect." 328
U.S. at pp. 350, 369. As was mentioned in nA1, supra, Frankfurter and the
majority seem to be in substantial accord on this point.
1956-1957]
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issue criticized is itself pending at the time of publication might be
questioned. While some degree of objectivity is necessary in such a
case, there are indications that the Court might not be as readily dis-
posed to impose so rigid a standard of character upon the judiciary
as was imposed in the Pennekamp decision.
4
4
Having thus restricted the scope within which the "clear and present
danger" rule could effectively operate, it remained to be determined
just how the rule would be applied in a proper case -that is, where
the particular issue commented upon was pending at the time of publi-
cation. Bridges v. California had shed some light on this question, but
the final word was not to come until 1946, when Craig v. Harney45
was decided. That case involved an action to compel forfeiture of a
lease for nonpayment of rent. The defendant was in the armed forces
and his affairs were being conducted by an agent. At the close of
the testimony both sides moved for an instructed verdict. Without
hearing argument on either side, the judge, a layman, granted plain-
tiff's motion and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plain-
tiff. The evidence supported this action. Nevertheless, the jury re-
fused to do so and found for the defendant. The judge repeated his
instruction with the same result, and court was adjourned. The fol-
lowing day, on the advice of defendant's counsel, the jury returned
the instructed verdict, stating that it was action under coercion of the
court and against its conscience. Two days later the defendant moved
for a new trial. During the next several days the local newspapers
blasted the judge as incompetent and his action as "highhanded," "a
refusal to hear both sides" and "a travesty on justice," and in effect
demanded that he grant defendant's motion and disqualify himself
from sitting further on the case.46 A contempt citation against the pub-
lishers was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, distinguishing the
Bridges and Pennekamp decisions.47 On certiorari, this holding was
reversed; the publications had not created, in the opinion of the Court,
a clear and present danger to the judicial determination of the de-
fendant's motion for new trial. The Court pointed to the fact that
the chief complaint against the judge's decision was his failure to hear
argument on the motions for directed verdict and reasoned:.
44 In the Bridges case, where the issue was directly considered, the "objective
standard" analysis was conspicuous by its absence. Subsequently, in Craig v.
Harney, ante., n.45, this statement was made by the majority: ". . . the law of
contempt is not made for . . . judges who may be sensitive to the winds of
public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a
hardy climate. Conceivably a campaign could be so aimed at the sensibilities of
a particular judge and the matter pending before him as to cross the forbidden
line." 331 U.S. at p. 376.
45 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1289, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947).
46 Ibid., n.44. 331 U.S. at pp. 378-383.
47 Ex Parte Craig, 150 Tex. Cr. 598, 193 S.W.2d 842 (1946).
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".. . it is hard to see on the facts how (the publications) could
obstruct the course of justice in the case before the court. The
only demand was for a hearing. There was no demand that
the judge reverse his position - or else."'48
It is thus apparent that the complaint which was originally made
against the Bridges decision was not entirely unjustified. While reiter-
ating that "public comment of every character may (not) be as free
as a similar comment after complete disposal of the litigation" and
"courts must have the power to protect the interests of prisoners and
litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert judicial action," 49
the Court has so restricted the use of the contempt power in this area
as to render it practically incapable of exercise, and seems willing to
indulge in any form of rationalization reasonable on its face in order
to avoid the necessity of finding a clear and present danger to justice.
Actually, it is doubtful if the press requires such jealous protection.
On the other hand, it is difficult to conclude on the basis of the above
cases, that this aspect of the contempt power has in effect been held
unconstitutional. Conceivably there is still a proper case in which
the use of the power would be justified, but such a case would prob-
ably involve a type of comment which the ethics of the press would
prohibit.
ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE JURIES
It must be noted that the above material deals primarily with
publications which attempt to influence a court in non-jury proceed-
ings. Where a jury trial is involved and a publication appears which
contains matters calculated to affect the ability of the jury to judi-
cially decide the issues before it, a rather different question is pre-
sented. Possibly due to a decent restraint on the part of the press
where jurors are concerned, no decisions since the date of the Bridges
case have been discovered in which a federal court has had to deter-
mine whether the First Amendment would be a defense to a contempt
citation on this ground °
48 Supra, n.44. 331 U.S. at p. 377.
41 Pennekamp v. Florida, supra, n.35. 328 U.S. at pp. 346, 347.
50 A number of cases have treated the issue obliquely, however: see Shepherd v.
Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 71 S.Ct. 549, 95 L.Ed. 740 (1950), Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter concurring, indicating that the rule might be somewhat different.
See also Maltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949),
certiorari denied 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562, but see the opinion
of Frankfurter, J., therein. The only case discovered to directly consider the
issue at all is Hoffman v. Perrucci, 222 F.2d 709 (1955). In that case, defend-
ants had caused to be published a number of advertisements cautioning the
public against making excessive awards, when serving on juries, against in-
surance companies. Plaintiff, who had a jury case pending with which the de-
fendants were not involved, and which had not yet come to trial, moved for a
contempt citation. Held, the District Court had properly dismissed the cita-
tion. There was no clear and present danger that a future jury would be af-
fected by the publication. The case indicates that, in general, only publications
containing matter likely to influence a jury which appear after the jury has
been selected might come within the operation of the rule.
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As might be expected, the English rule on this question was quite
strict. Publication of any matter tending to prejudice a jury in a
pending proceeding, or of matter which would be inadmissable on the
trial, was sufficient to sustain a finding of contempt;"' nor was it
necessary to show that the jury had actually read the article, but only
that it had been made public and that jurors had had access to it. 52
Mere criticism of a jury's verdict would not usually give rise to a
citation for contempt.53
This view was substantially adopted by the American state courts,
and generally remains the law today.5 4 The federal courts, are of
course, governed by the federal statute.5 5 Whether the Bridges case
would operate to change this rule is doubtful. In theory, at least,
neither that case nor the ones that followed it completely abrogated
the use of the contempt power in this area. Moreover, the function
of a jury is relatively limited, usually confined to the determination of
a single issue or set of issues at the conclusion of the trial, and the
facility with which the court would be able to draw such technical
distinctions as were made in the Pennekamp decision would be some-
what curtailed. Lastly, since it is to be strongly doubted whether the
angelic qualities attributed to judges would be imputed to jurors, the
Court might be more disposed to find a clear and present danger.
THO MAS LUSCEER
51 The King v. Tibbets, (1902) 1 K.B. 77, 2 B. R.C. 469 (Annotated).52 Ibid., n.50.
53 Reg. v. O'Doherty, (1845) 5 Cox, C.C. 348. Supra, n.50.
54 12 AM. JuR. 417; In Re Independent Pub. Co., 240 F. 849, L.R.A. 1917E 703,"
Ann. Cas. 1917E 1084 (1917).
55 U.S. ex. rel. May v. American Machinery Co., 116 F.Supp. 160 (1953). That
case held that circulation of articles and advertisements similar in character to
those involved in the Hoffman case (Supra, n.49) among prospective jurors
did not come within the statute.
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